The concerns I express here are not new, and I would like to see Kantian thinkers spend more time defending what they so often assume.

That said, this book is not generally dogmatic, and it is a touch too short and elegant for the purpose of answering mountains of objections. I recommend it highly to those who want more philosophical contact between Kant-inspired and Hume-inspired moral psychologists and to those who wonder in general whether sticking to your self-imposed bedtime is a matter of human dignity or just a means to avoid crashing the next day.

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Sebo, Jeff. *Saving Animals, Saving Ourselves: Why Animals Matter for Pandemics, Climate Change, and Other Catastrophes.*
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022. Pp. 272. $37.99 (cloth).

Jeff Sebo's *Saving Animals, Saving Ourselves* offers an ambitious and passionate call for the inclusion of nonhuman animals (henceforth animals) in our personal deliberations and political decisions, where they have so far been routinely neglected. As he highlights, the past few years have brought issues of animal suffering to the forefront. The book was written during the worst of the COVID-19 pandemic, which impacted not only humans but also animals, and its influence is clear throughout. Animal agriculture is increasingly under pressure, with many turning vegetarian or vegan in response to the suffering and environmental destruction created by the farming industry. In the summer of 2020, Australia suffered from intense bushfires that killed millions of animals and endangered the koala population. Another recent example can be seen in the global spread of avian flu (H5N1)—incubated and mutated within high-density poultry farms, but now spreading through populations of wild birds, with catastrophic outcomes for many. With global crises of these kinds becoming increasingly common, our interrelations with animals and our entwined fates are more salient than ever. Human and animal fates, Sebo elegantly demonstrates, have become increasingly interlinked through climate change, environmental destruction, and large-scale industrial farming. What, then, should we do about the striking suffering animals experience—suffering that is often caused by our own actions and can in turn cause human suffering?

Sebo's main thesis is that our poor treatment of animals is harmful not only to them but also to ourselves and the environment and that this provides us with a moral responsibility to reduce and repair these harms as best we can. His approach is largely pragmatic, showing that there are many ways to improve animal lives even within the confines of our epistemic and sociopolitical limitations. He does quick work in identifying and condemning the main culprits—factory farming, deforestation, and the wildlife trade—due to their links to global disasters such as climate change and pandemics, and suggests many ways for how we can improve animal lives.

The first part of the book makes the case for including animals within our health and environmental advocacy and policy. The basic argument can be reconstructed as follows:

1. We have a moral responsibility to prevent, reduce, or repair harm to non-human animals (ethical premise).
2. Human activity is causing a large amount of harm to nonhuman animals that we have the capacity to prevent, reduce, or repair (empirical premise).
3. Therefore, we have a moral responsibility to prevent, reduce, or repair a large amount of harm to nonhuman animals.

Sebo begins by defending the premises, making a strong case for why we should take this argument seriously, and uses the second part of the book to examine exactly how we might do so in practice. While we think that it is difficult to deny his ethical case for the minimization of harm for nonhuman animals, it is the empirical details and possibilities for change that will make the real difference.

The argument for the first premise is brief, as he takes this more as a given, which we think is justified. Almost no one believes that we have no duties toward nonhuman animals, so the interesting work is in determining which duties and how far they extend. Sebo takes the answer to this question to require more than just a single, simplistic moral theory. Instead, he argues for a pluralistic moral framework that incorporates elements of both consequentialist and nonconsequentialist thinking, which he hopes can be accepted by defenders of both views, to allow for collective action. This is perhaps one of the most distinctive contributions made in the book, supplementing similar arguments he has made elsewhere (see Tyler M. John and Jeff Sebo, "Consequentialism and Nonhuman Animals," in *Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism*, ed. D. M. Portmore [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020], 564–91). In essence, he contends that neither consequentialist nor nonconsequentialist thinking has sufficient resources to deal with the scope of the problem of our duties to nonhuman animals in the context of the Anthropocene, and that they should therefore each be supplemented by the other.

Utilitarianism in practice faces the challenges of our limited knowledge about the exact consequences of our possible actions, our limited power to take the "best" actions, and limitations in individual motivation for altruistic action. For this reason, nonconsequentialist thinking can help instrumentally in achieving utilitarian aims. Application of rights theory in the face of complex real-world problems involving conflicts or trade-offs between individuals can still require harm-benefit analyses of the type utilitarians perform. This therefore creates a partial convergence of the theories, at least within the context of considering our duties toward nonhuman animals. The convergence provides roughly the following pair of views: we have a duty to help animals as much as we reasonably can (but a right to spend some of our resources on our own personal projects and relationships), and we have a duty to avoid unnecessary harms to nonhuman animals in pursuit of our goals, but a right to harm animals in some exceptional cases (e.g., self-defense, or a sufficiently large greater good). In Sebo's words, "According to this shared moral framework, we should aspire to help animals as much as reasonably possible, and we should also aspire to harm animals only when necessary for self-defense, other-defense, and other such purposes. For consequentialists, we should accept this framework because it allows us to help animals as effectively as possible, given our epistemic, practical, and motivational limitations. For nonconsequentialists,

we should accept it because it allows us to respect nonhuman rights as effectively as possible, given the source, scale, and complexity of animal suffering in the world" (15–16). This also fits well with some degree of humility about the correct moral theory, in the face of so much disagreement, and is intended to provide a framework that allows everyone to build coalitions to work collectively on the most pressing problems, even if they will still disagree on some of the details.

In support of the second premise, he presents a wealth of empirical evidence that shows exactly how human activities—especially intensive animal agriculture, deforestation, and the wildlife trade—are causing a range of harms to nonhuman animals. In the Anthropocene, there are almost no animals left untouched by the effects of our actions, and so our duties extend much further than is typically assumed. There is a strong emphasis on the interconnection and vulnerability between humans, nonhumans, and the environment. Our uses of animals are not only direct causes of their suffering but also indirect causes of more widespread global suffering through their effects on changes in climate and risk of pandemics. Animals are both the causes and the victims of global disasters.

In the second part of the book, Sebo examines how these duties may be discharged in practice. He advocates for a variety of actions, such as (i) advocacy, (ii) research, (iii) reduced support for industries that harm animals (and increased support for alternatives), and (iv) increased education on animal issues and employment in animal-related careers. Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, Sebo advocates for the legal and political recognition of animals as more than objects or property for their inclusion in social and political decision-making. He analyzes the barriers to change—such as lack of knowledge and entrenched social and political systems—and how to make the required trade-offs. Importantly, he recognizes the difficulty of making the changes he advocates, noting that "it will require radical social, political, and economic change, and it will also require us to confront the limits of our knowledge, power, and political will" (3). He emphasizes the need for holistic, structural thinking that addresses the root causes of the problems discussed, and he aims to avoid repairing a narrow set of issues at the expense of other problems. He examines the examples of the One Health and Green New Deal movements, noting their similarities to his own view in terms of a more holistic, structural, and interconnected action, but also highlighting their limitations—primarily in considering animals only instrumentally for human ends, and failing to call for a reduction or end to animal agriculture.

In many ways, *Saving Animals, Saving Ourselves* can be read as both a utilitarian call and a guide for action to stop the neglect of our fellow creatures. By this, however, we don't mean that the book offers lengthy discussions of ethical theories or argues for the correctness of utilitarianism, nor that Sebo presents himself as a staunch utilitarian (he doesn't try to convince the reader of any particular moral theory, but instead advocates the benefits of a pluralistic approach). Rather, the book is ruthlessly oriented in trying to convince as many people as possible—whatever their theoretical and ethical commitments may be—so as to increase the chances of actually reducing or preventing animal suffering. This is consistent with a utilitarian approach—under this view it fundamentally doesn't matter whether others themselves become utilitarian but rather whether we can make the world a better place, not only for ourselves but also for the animals we share this planet with. In this sense

the book is very much a consequentialist one, aimed more at achieving real-world change than at defending any particular philosophical thesis—with the exception perhaps of the broader idea that animals need to play a much bigger role in our moral and political decisions. Where much of the philosophical writing in ethics focuses on theoretical debates, this is perhaps most strikingly a problem for consequentialists who aim at better outcomes. We appreciate Sebo's book as an exemplar for any philosopher interested in making real social and political change, as opposed to just engaging in theoretical debate with other philosophers.

Given the title of the book, one could be led to the misconception that it is taking a purely instrumentalist stance, in which animal rights and protection legislation are motivated only in order to achieve benefits for ourselves. But Sebo is no instrumentalist. His deep empathy is obvious in his impassioned arguments that animals also matter for their own sake. Nevertheless, as we note above, the book fundamentally aims at convincing as many people as possible, even if that includes those who only change their treatment of other animals because of how this might help themselves. While Sebo doesn't think that this is enough and believes that instrumentalist thinking can be misused for self-interest, it is still clear that a lot of suffering we inflict on animals is unnecessary and doesn't bring humans additional overall benefits, when other global effects are considered. Regardless of whether the reader is an instrumentalist or adopts a broadly utilitarian or rights-based view of ethics, Sebo similarly makes an excellent case for why animals should feature much more significantly in our decision-making than they currently do. This is crucial, because even if one were to deny the more radical implications of his arguments, it is almost impossible to deny that our current efforts are insufficient.

In the background of the discussion is an unspoken commitment to longtermist thinking (i.e., that most of the value of our current actions will be realized in the far future, due to the much larger number of individuals that will live then as compared to now). This is rarely made explicit, but it is clear that Sebo takes the primary value of action now to be in its future benefits. The social, political, legal, and economic institutions we set in place now will impact the lives of far more future animals than we have at present. In particular, he emphasizes the importance of actions that change attitudes toward nonhuman animals and our interactions with them as having fundamental and lasting effects. This is a view we are sympathetic to, and we have elsewhere argued for a similar perspective (see Heather Browning and Walter Veit, "Longtermism and Animals," in *Essays on Longtermism*, ed. J. Barrett, H. Greaves, and D. Thorstad [Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming]). While social change can often seem unsatisfactorily slow, we shouldn't get discouraged by gradual improvements. Even a small improvement for the lives of animals now can make a huge difference if it extends to the very large number of farmed animals that may ever exist in the future. However, whether or not one agrees with the longtermist viewpoint, here the values and actions are aligned, as making the changes he suggests will be good for animals both in the present and in the future.

One final key theme that emerges from the more pragmatic part of the discussion is an urgent need for better ways of understanding and representing the interests of animals. Taking animals seriously within multispecies impact assessments, for example, requires facing difficult questions about the sentience of other

species, their capacity for welfare, and the type and strength of their interests. Making comparisons across species is a complex issue that has only recently been addressed in research (see Heather Browning, "Welfare Comparisons within and across Species," *Philosophical Studies* 180 [2023]: 529–51; Leigh P. Gaffney et al., "A Theoretical Approach to Improving Interspecies Welfare Comparisons," *Frontiers in Animal Science* 3 [2023]: 1062458). There is thus just as much a call for increased research into these areas as there is a call for political and social change.

Readers will almost certainly find much they both agree and disagree with. While there might be a broad consensus on the existence and importance of animal suffering, there is still huge disagreement regarding the best strategies we can follow to minimize said suffering. The questions raised by Sebo are incredibly complex, requiring input from a lot of different fields and, of course, complex solutions. However, the main value in this book (over and above introducing wonderful new puns such as "the reBUGnant conclusion" [175] and "the swan identity problem" [178]) is in opening up the conversations that we need to be having in order to rethink our relationships with other animals in an ever more interconnected world.

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